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Taking Lessons from the Left?:
Judicial Activism on the Right
STEPHEN

F.

SMITH*

I. INTRODUCTION

At the outset, let me say that I am delighted and honored to participate in this
inaugural issue of the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy. This
Journal responds to a pervasive problem in the legal academy: the underrepresentation of conservative scholarship in many of the leading law reviews. It is
therefore essential that journals such as this one exist to provide a needed outlet
for conservative thought, which continues to receive only scant, marginalized
attention from the top law reviews more than a decade after such ideas reached
ascendancy on the Supreme Court of the United States. Needless to say,
conservative legal thought is neither infallible nor inevitably correct-no brand
of human thought is. If, however, truth and genuine understanding are the aims
of scholarship (and they should be), then a necessary condition is an open
marketplace of ideas, one in which all sorts of viewpoints have the opportunity
to compete and be heard. This journal, in short, is an idea whose time has come,
and I am particularly glad that the sometimes (oftentimes?) beleaguered conservative law students at Georgetown University will finally have a forum where
their bright ideas and creative energies will find a hospitable reception.
The topic I would like to address in this essay is the subject of conservative
judicial activism. Dismayed at the boldness of the Rehnquist Court's conservative majority in areas such as affirmative action and race-based redistricting,'
federalism, 2 takings law, 3 and my own field of constitutional criminal procedure,4 critics have accused the Court of being "activist." 5 These attacks have
become almost ubiquitous now, to the point that it is increasingly difficult to
find any area of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence that has not been con-

* Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1988, Dartmouth College; J.D.
1992, University of Virginia. I thank Lillian BeVier, Earl Dudley, Richard Fallon, Michael Klarman,
David Martin, Caleb Nelson, George Rutherglen, and Michael Seidman for helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this project. Any remaining errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
5. For two illustrative examples, see Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and
Wrong with Conservative JudicialActivism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000); Donald H. Zeigler, The New
Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
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demned as activist.6 Perhaps this is not surprising; the term "activism" packs a

powerful rhetorical punch, especially when applied to conservative judges,
whose self-image is that of legal technicians interpreting and applying-not
"making"-the law. What is surprising, however, is how sharp and often
vituperative the accusations of conservative judicial activism usually are.
A case in point is Erwin Chemerinsky's influential Foreword to the 1989
volume of the Harvard Law Review. 7 Just three years into the life of the
Rehnquist Court, Professor Chemerinsky proclaimed that, due to the Court's
conservative judicial philosophy, the Constitution itself-and, along with it, the
' 8
cherished civil liberties that are our birthright as Americans-was "vanishing.
In his view, the Constitution is becoming a thing of the mind, with the rights of
citizens and the scope of governmental authority being controlled, as he puts it
in a later piece, by the "right-wing political agenda." 9 Pretty scary stuff, if you
ask me. Naturally, this leads one to wonder how this band of enemies domestic
ever got on the Supreme Court (or past the character and fitness review of their
local bar examiners) in the first place.
I find at least two things striking about these lines of attacks on the current
Court. The first is their hypocrisy. Although Professor Chemerinsky and likeminded critics never seem to miss an occasion to bash the Court for activism
that tilts to the right, they are all too content to look the other way-and, even
more often, affirmatively applaud-activism of the opposite political bent.' °
Take, for example, criminal procedure.
The Warren Court was serially activist or, as another commentator aptly put
it, "promiscuous" in its "jurisprudential creativity."" It invented unprecedented
constitutional rights (such as the right of suspects to warnings of their rights not
to submit to police interrogation and to have a lawyer present during questioning).' 2 The Warren Court also read into the Fourth Amendment the rule that
probative evidence must be excluded at trial if it was illegally obtained.' 3 This
rule, historically speaking, had been rejected in Anglo-American legal systems
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 413 n.134 (1997) (describing
as "activist" the Rehnquist Court's conservative decisions "on federalism, affirmative action, minority
voting rights, campaign finance reform, hate speech regulations, and environmental land use restrictions").
7. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 104 (1989).
8. Id. at 47.
9. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, I WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37,
37 (1999) (hereinafter, Chemerinsky, Oxymoron); see also, e.g., Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100
YALE L.J. 1128 (1991) (describing the Rehnquist Court as "alien and hostile, less devoted to reaffirming
and actualizing our national ideals than to protecting the established order").
10. See Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Activism of the Right: A Mistaken and Futile Hope, in LiBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 85-86 (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds., 1990)
(noting the trend of scholars to "defend judicial activism on the left by declaring left-wing judicial
activists American heroes" yet condemn activism of the right as a "judicial usurpation of lawmaking
power").
11. Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REV. 817, 830 n.49 (1993).
12. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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in favor of preserving the truth-seeking functions of trials and had been specifically rejected as a constitutional mandate in state court cases." The Warren
Court's lawmaking in criminal procedure was so pervasive, and so unconcerned
about notions of federalism or deference to majoritarian policy choices, that
criminal procedure today stands almost entirely federalized-which is why we
now speak of
"constitutional criminal procedure" instead of simply "criminal
5

procedure." '

In the Warren Court's defense, it should be noted that state courts at the time
had consistently proven to be remarkably insensitive to certain kinds of gross
miscarriages of justice. This insensitivity was nowhere greater than in Southern
courts trying black defendants for serious crimes (typically, murder and rape)
against whites. 16 In response to the ugly face of racism in the criminal justice
system, the Court proceeded to constitutionalize criminal procedure and thereby
transferred to the federal courts the ultimate responsibility for deciding the
fairness of state criminal trials nationwide. It was only natural-and, I would
argue, justified-for a Court witnessing Jim Crow-style "justice," in case after
case, to intervene. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly guarantees all
citizens the right to "equal protection of the laws," an unquestioned mandate for
the federal courts to protect blacks against racist state action in the criminal
justice system and elsewhere, and the Due Process Clause invalidates unfair
trial procedures that aggravate the risk that factually innocent defendants will be
convicted. 17
Where the Court so grievously erred, in my view, was not in doing something
to address racial injustice in criminal trials, but rather in responding in a
patently overbroad way to the very real problem of race. The Court apparently
viewed itself as having only a binary set of options in responding to statesponsored racism: either do nothing (and thereby allow racism in state prosecutions to go unchecked) or constitutionalize criminal procedure in its entirety.
Clearly, however, if mistreatment of black suspects and black defendants was
really the operative concern (as opposed to more generalized doubts concerning•
the fairness of the criminal justice system generally for all defendants), then
14. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In
Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first adopted the concept of the exclusionary rule. Wolf held
that, although the Fourth Amendment applied against the states, the implied remedy of exclusion did
not. In terms of the historical approach to exclusion of illegally seized evidence, "exclusion is not and
never has been the British rule" and, in America, there was no endorsement "from the Founding--or
even the antebellum or Reconstruction eras-supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence in a
criminal trial." Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786, 789
(1994).
15. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure,33 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
1123, 1132 (1996).
16. For an interesting survey of the travesties of justice that the Supreme Court encountered in
criminal cases coming from the "Jim Crow" South, see Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins Of
Modem CriminalProcedure,99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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there was a third option available to the Court: the adoption of minimalist
constitutional rules, grounded on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
that were narrowly tailored to the problem of racism in the criminal justice
system. 8
Had the Court taken this kind of minimalist approach, racial injustice could
have been effectively addressed. Of course, the task of policing the states would
have been too large for the Court to have performed singlehandedly, but it did
not face that daunting prospect because the Court had expanded habeas corpus
to allow state prisoners to relitigate in the lower federal courts federal claims of
error rejected in the state courts.' 9 With the lower federal courts thus available
to perform the close, case-specific scrutiny of state prosecutions that the Supreme Court was institutionally unable to perform, there was simply no need for
overbroad rulings like Miranda v. Arizona. Inaccurate or unfair convictions
produced by racism or other improper influences could be reversed for articulable reasons specific to the case in question without disturbing accurate convictions achieved through fair, nonracist means. This approach, though potentially
more burdensome for the federal courts, might have made the ultimate decision
to overturn the conviction more acceptable to state officials and the public and,
in any event, would not have given a windfall to guilty defendants (black or
white) who were fairly convicted for their crimes.
At the same time, however, a narrowly tailored, minimalist strategy would
have addressed the problem of racism in a way that would not have provoked a

18. This more incremental and focused response to racism had been the approach taken by prior
Courts. For example, discriminatory exclusion of black jurors had been struck down on equal
protection grounds, see, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880), and criminal trials conducted in a "lynch mob" atmosphere had been condemned as
contrary to the fair adjudication required by due process, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
What was so distinctive about the Warren Court was its impatience with incremental steps as vehicles
for constitutional change and its willingness to issue broad, sweeping rulings such as Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)--rulings more akin to legislative mandates than common law decisionmaking-to effect constitutional reform. Miranda is sometimes touted as a superior, more administrable
mechanism for protecting the voluntariness of custodial confessions. Now, after sixty Supreme Court
decisions and countless lower court rulings fleshing out what we now know as "Miranda doctrine,"
perhaps it is more administrable. The relevant question, however, is whether that considerable judicial
manpower would have been better spent, in terms of helping suspects deal with coercive interrogation
techniques, on trying to sort out "good" versus "bad" interrogation techniques. One thing that scholars
from both ends of the spectrum seem to agree on is that that Miranda is a poor substitute for probing
judicial inquiry into the voluntariness of confessions. See William J. Stuntz , Miranda's Mistake, 99
MIcH. L. REV. 975, 992 (2001) (arguing that "Miranda doesn't regulate police interrogation at all" but
instead "leaves interrogation unregulated for most suspects, and forbidden for a few [i.e., those savvy
enough not to talk without a lawyer present]"); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF.
L. REV. 673, 746 (1992) (noting that "there is a good deal of evidence that Miranda ... traded the
promise of substantial reform implicit in prior doctrine for a political symbol").
19. A habeas corpus case is a proceeding initiated in U.S. District Court in which a state prisoner
challenges the legality of his conviction or sentence on federal law grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Habeas corpus was originally quite limited in scope, but had been broadened by the 1960s to allow
full-scale relitigation in federal court. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953).
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"counterrevolution" by later conservative majorities on the Supreme
Court.
Brown v. Board of Education is instructive. For all of the controversy that
surrounded Brown's issuance, the decision has been so enduring because the
Court's decision striking down segregation was tied directly to race. Instead of
trying to address wealth-driven differences in the quality of neighborhood
schools or other inequities in public education, the Court rested on a morally
compelling constitutional principle-racial equality-and thereby forced the
nation to confront head-on the ugliness of racism in public education. Today, as
a result, de jure segregation is a thing of the past, societal attitudes about race
relations are far more progressive than they were during the 1950s, and Brown
is "widely regarded as one of the great landmarks in the history of constitutional
1
2

law.",

The story was considerably different, both in terms of judicial strategy and
effectiveness, in criminal procedure. In place of the tailored approach that was
critical to the long-term success of Brown, the Court used racial injustice as a
sort of excuse in criminal procedure to "develop[] a series of formally raceneutral rules for constraining police, prosecutors, and the courts." 22 The breadth
of the Court's takeover of criminal procedure had at least two perverse, unintended consequences. First, it shifted the focus of the debate away from racism
and accuracy of results (where it ought to have been) to sterile rules of
procedure often having little if any grounding in the Constitution. It also drove
the costs of the Warren Court's new constitutional mandates, measured in terms
of interference with legitimate law enforcement and the truth-finding function
of criminal trials, to intolerable levels. Seen in this light, the Warren Court
sowed the seeds of its own destruction, making the political revolution that
swept Richard Nixon into the White House in 1968-and the "Counterrevolution" later waged by Nixon's appointees and those of his Republican successors
on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in criminal procedure-almost inevitable. 23

20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Seidman, supra note 18, at 708. I should note that Professor Seidman's wonderfully thoughtprovoking article contends that Brown was a broad, aggressive decision no different from Miranda or
other controversial Warren Court criminal procedure decisions. Id. at 678-79. In arguing that Brown
was really a "tactical retreat[]" instead of a radical advance in social progress, id. at 680, however,
Professor Seidman comes closer to my characterization of Brown as a narrowly tailored decision. As he
put it, "once white society was willing to make facilities legally nonseparate [as Brown required], the
demand for equality had been satisfied and blacks no longer had just cause for complaint" even though
"many blacks remained poor and disempowered." Id. This seems to support my characterization of
Brown as a decision that was narrowly tailored to the problem of race and public schools.
22. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, And Remedies In CriminalAdjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001,
2002 (1998).
23. The "Counterrevolution" in criminal procedure refers to the decades-long efforts by the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts to roll-back the Warren Court's innovative rulings, and the Warren Court's
innovations in criminal procedure are known as the "Revolution." See Carol Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2466 (1996). Legislatures played a leading role in the roll-back as well, as Professor Bill Stuntz has
cogently argued: "As courts have raised the cost of criminal investigation and prosecution, legislatures
have sought out devices to reduce those costs. Severe limits on defense funding are the most obvious
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Even the Warren Court's many defenders in the academy do not deny the
radical, far-reaching nature of its jurisprudence. To the contrary, they commend
the Court for undertaking what one admirer described as "a program of constitutional reform [that was] almost revolutionary in its aspiration and, now and
then, in its accomplishments. '2 4 In taking this "revolutionary" course, the Court
tossed aside so many established precedents that "[t]he list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of contents from an old
constitutional law casebook., 25 Defenders of the Warren Court applaud the
Court's activism in constitutional criminal procedure, as in other areas, yet now
bitterly criticize the Rehnquist Court for being activist, including in the same
areas and in the same manner in which the Warren Court had been activist
decades earlier.2 6
For example, Professor Chemerinsky describes the Rehnquist Court as an
"activist" and, indeed, "disast[rous]" Court because it "shows little deference to
the majoritarian branches of government and ... has little respect for prece-

dent.",27 By this measure, of course, the Warren Court itself could hardly be
described as any less "disastrous" than the Rehnquist Court, and may well have
been the most "disastrous" Court in history. Without having done a precise
study myself, I suspect that the Warren Court overturned far more precedents
and, taking into account criminal convictions, disturbed far more exercises of
state and federal governmental power than the Rehnquist Court has or ever will.
If willingness to overturn precedent and actions of the political branches is the
criterion, then, perhaps the Rehnquist Court has been "disastrous"-but, then
again, so has the Warren Court and probably every other Court in history. The only
way out of this box for defenders of the Warren Court is to contend that liberal
judicial activism is permissible whereas conservative judicial activism is not.
As an aside, it is worth remembering that it was not always this way in liberal
constitutional law scholarship. During the infamous "Lochner era," named after
Lochner v. New York, 2 8 the Court's activism tilted to the right, protecting
"liberty to contract" from what was perceived to be undue interference by social

example, but not the only one. Expanded criminal liability makes it easier for the government to induce
guilty pleas, as do high mandatory sentences that serve as useful threats against recalcitrant defendants.
And guilty pleas avoid most of the potentially costly requirements that criminal procedure imposes."
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997).
24. Fiss, supra note 9, at 1118.
25. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
26. Conservatives do not escape the charge of hypocrisy either: they thundered against the liberal
activism of the Warren Court, for example, but are all too willing to remain silent as the Rehnquist
Court resorts to activism in pursuit of conservative ends. This form of conservative hypocrisy mirrors
bold conservative proclamations about the evil of treating people differently on grounds of race in
attacking affirmative action, but these same proponents of racial equality somehow see no need to
condemn discrimination against minorities-only "reverse discrimination," it would seem, is of concern to them.
27. Chemerinsky, Oxymoron, supra note 9, at 37.
28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

2002]

TAKING LESSONS FROM THE LEFT?: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT

63

reform-minded state legislatures and Congress by striking down close to two
hundred economic regulatory measures. 29 Liberal scholars condemned the Court,
but not on the ground that the Court was reaching politically conservative
results. Their objection, rather, was more fundamental and more compelling:
Lochner was wrong because "it involved 'judicial activism': an illegitimate
intrusion by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of
30
government.,
In any event, the notion that whether activism is proper or not depends
entirely on whether the judge is enforcing the "right" values, or reaching the
"right" results, strikes me as profoundly hypocritical. If activism is acceptable
from the Warren Court, and if activism is a proper means of advancing a liberal
vision of law, how can it possibly be objectionable when employed by later
courts and judges for purposes different from those that motivated Chief Justice
Warren? The Constitution is not a one-way liberal ratchet any more than it is a
one-way conservative or libertarian (or anything else) ratchet. 3 ' To treat the
document any differently-that is to say, to treat the Constitution as a "ventriloquist's dummy" and justices as "the puppeteer[s]" 32 -is to denigrate its impor33
tance and, indeed, to call into question the very legitimacy of judicial review.

29. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 739 (1986).
30. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner' Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987). It may well be that
some of these critiques of Lochner were simply pretext for outcome-based disagreement with the Court.
Still, the bulk of the then-contemporary liberal critiques of Lochner appear to have been genuinely
motivated by a conviction that the Court had been engaging in "judicial legislation" in service of its
own ideological ends. See generally Martin Shapiro, Fathersand Sons: The Court, the Commentators,
and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 218 (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983) (explaining that for liberal scholars during the New Deal, Lochner was "a highly
personal and often formative experience" that gave rise to their "endlessly [writing] about judicial
self-restraint"). We see the opposite phenomenon now: the first brush of leading members of the
academy today with activism was with Warren's liberal activism. To fans of Justice Warren's bold
initiatives, restraint was an obstacle to progress in the fight against injustice-and, I readily concede,
many of the Court's results were commendable, as a moral matter, in terms of the racism and other
social ills against which the Court took aim. To them, the Warren Court legacy showed the considerable
good that an activist court could accomplish if freed from the bounds of precedent and law. With that
realization, the ghosts of Lochner were exorcised from their collective consciousness, to be reawakened
only decades later when the Court fell into unfriendly-that is to say, conservative-hands.
31. For an interesting critique of the "one-way ratchet" approach to constitutional law, described (in
the terminology of voting rights law) as "non-retrogression" on rights, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl
J. Levinson, The Non-RetrogressionPrinciple in ConstitutionalLaw, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211 (1998).
32. Amar, supra note 15, at 1130.
33. Once extra-constitutional values and norms are read into the Constitution, and text and structure
disregarded in pursuit of worthy but nonetheless indeterminate goals like "fairness" and "justice," then,
regardlessof whether the judge's politics tilt to the left or to the right, politically unaccountable judges
will be setting aside popularly enacted measures without warrant in the "fundamental law" that is the
Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). If judges are permitted to strike
down laws or criminal convictions based on mere disagreement with legislative policy judgments,
self-government will become the exception rather than the rule because, as de Tocqueville wrote,
"scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question." I Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Henry
Reeve et al. trans., Vintage Books 1990).
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The second striking aspect of recent attacks on the Rehnquist Court's
purported activism is the bankruptcy of the attackers' concept of "activism,"
a problem inherent in many contemporary uses of the term "activism." Once
one cuts through the rhetorical underbrush, such uses of the term "activism"
are usually revealed as intellectually bankrupt, signifying nothing more than
mere disagreement with a decision as an intellectual or policy matter. In the
vast majority of cases, the accusation of activism is simply leveled, and
readers are left to guess what notion of activism (if any) the accuser has in
mind.3 4 If, however, what "activism" means is that a result in a particular
case is deemed erroneous or unwise as a policy matter, the term serves no
useful purpose, except perhaps as a shorthand way of expressing disagreement over judicial outcomes.3 5 In that instance, the debate would more
profitably be focused on the correctness or wisdom of those outcomes
directly instead of on the tangential, and ultimately empty, question of
whether those outcomes are "activist"-a position that Professor Mark
Tushnet ultimately advocates. 36

I think this sensible response to current usage of the term "activism" nevertheless should be resisted. Despite current (mis)usage, a commonly held intuition
underlying the concept of activism is that a judicial decision can be more than
just wrong or unwise but actually improper or illegitimate.37 As a result, to
accuse a judge of "activism" is actually to suggest that the judge has engaged in
an illegitimate exercise of judicial power, and it is therefore not surprising that
judges dissenting from what they believe to be an activist decision often
proclaim that they will not accord the decision the usual precedential force
afforded by stare decisis rules.3 8

Without at least some common ground on the proper role of judges-as I
think can be captured in a careful, ideologically balanced approach to defining
"activism"-we run the risk that scholarly discourse will degenerate, as it
already has to some extent, into insoluble disputes over methods of constitu-

34. See Bradley C. Cannon, A Frameworkfor the Analysis of JudicialActivism, in SUPREME COURT
ACtiVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb, eds., 1982) (noting that
"conceptions of activism are usually not explicitly noted or articulated").
35. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47
MD. L. REV. 147, 153 (1987) ("Given an extended discussion of the courts in which the sentence 'This
was an activist decision' appears, we can translate the sentence, knowing its context, as 'I approve (or
disapprove) of the decision.' Similarly, if the sentence is 'I disapprove of this decision because it
exemplifies judicial activism,' we know nothing more after hearing the second half of the sentence than
we did after haring [sic] the first half.").
36. See id. at 147.
37. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 198 (1985) (observing
that activism serves as "a premier term of judicial opprobrium").
38. For a recent example, see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v. Maine,
Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEd. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, and College Savings Bank v.
Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. represents such a radical departure from the proper
role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.") (citations omitted).
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tional interpretation or policy considerations. In other words, as the last two
generations of constitutional law scholarship shows, scholars are hopelessly
divided on the proper methods of interpreting the Constitution,3 9 and as each
presidential election and judicial confirmation battle in the United States Senate
reminds us, our society is deeply divided over the wisdom of practices like
capital punishment, abortion, and affirmative action. Therefore, the quest for a
shared understanding about what constitutes "activism," one that is as distinct
as possible from the propriety of particular methods of constitutional interpretation, may be our last, best hope for reaching some degree of consensus
concerning what judges may properly do in discharging their important constitutional functions in a democratic society.
The hard part, of course, is coming up with a neutral definition of activism. In
the remainder of this essay, I grapple with this difficult issue. Specifically, I
discuss various proposed definitions of activism, organized into somewhat
arbitrary but nonetheless useful categories of models of activism. I conclude
that none of the existing models, standing alone, provides a reliable measuring
stick for evaluating the propriety of particular exercises of judicial power,
although each does provide insights essential to a realistic understanding of
activism. What is needed instead, I believe, is a multi-factored approach drawing on each of the individual models of activism. I close with an effort to distill
such an approach. I do so without any pretense to having found the "Rosetta
stone" on the issue of judicial activism, but instead in hopes that this inquiry
will prompt us at least to take more seriously the task of defining activism and
at least nudge the discussion in the right direction.

II.

UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
A. THE "CONFLICT" MODEL

One approach to activism emphasizes the degree of conflict between judicial
policy, on the one hand, and the policy of politically accountable branches of
government. On this view, a court "is activist whenever its policies are in
conflict with those of other major decision-makers., 40 This type of conflict was
clearly present throughout much of the Warren Court's Revolution in criminal
procedure: the Warren Court consistently favored the criminal defendant's side
of the balance, whereas legislatures just as consistently favored law enforce-

39. See Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 921, 922 (2001).
40. Glendon Schubert, A Functional Interpretation, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17 (David F. Forte ed., 1972). Posner advances a similar, but
not identical, definition of activism under which an activist decision is one that expands the "power of
the federal courts vis-h-vis the other organs of government." POSNER, supra note 37, at 210-2 11. This
definition of activism is subject to the same analysis as the conflict model because a decision
invalidating the acts of other branches of governments also necessarily expands the power of the courts
as against those branches.
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ment and being "tough on crime.'
Such conflict has also manifested itself in
the Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism" decisions 42invalidating Acts of Congress as beyond the scope of congressional authority.
Conflict between courts and the political branches is strongly correlated with
periods of heightened activism. During the Lochner era, for example, the
Supreme Court invalidated close to two hundred economic regulatory statutes
as contrary to liberty of contract. 43 The fact that so many statutes were overturned is usually taken as proof of activism, which explains why critics of the
Rehnquist Court are so quick to compare the current Court to the Lochner
Court-the comparison obviously is not intended to be flattering. 44 Even so, the
conflict model of activism is both overinclusive and underinclusive-overinclusive because, in our system, courts are supposed to strike down (and therefore
"conflict" with) unconstitutional action of other branches, and underinclusive
because the mere absence of conflict between legislative and judicial policies
does not itself establish the absence of judicial activism.
A simple example may help illustrate both points. Imagine that Congress passes a
statute allowing magistrates to issue search wan-ants on some standard lower than
probable cause. The statute would be a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment,
which specifically prescribes "probable cause" as the minimum standard on which
search warrants may be issued.45 The statute is challenged in court. Given that
the statute is irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment, the Court should
declare the statute unconstitutional. Suppose, however, that instead of enforcing
46
the Fourth Amendment, the court ignores it and upholds the statute anyway.

41. Compare, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the inherent coerciveness
of custodial interrogation warrants exclusion even of voluntary confessions unless preceded by advice
of the suspect's rights to counsel and to remain silent), with 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2001) (stating that
voluntary confessions are admissible despite pressures inherent in stationhouse interrogation and failure
to give Miranda warnings). This sort of conflict, usually manifested and most easily seen in the form of
judicial invalidation of statutes, was obviously not peculiar to the Warren era.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
43. See STONE ET AL., supra note 29, at 739.
44. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting a "striking"
similarity between the Rehnquist Court's sovereign-immunity decisions and "the Lochner era's industrial due process" and predicting that "the Court's late foray into immunity doctrine will prove the equal
of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and
probably as fleeting").
45. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation ...").
46. This example is not as far-fetched as it might initially seem; indeed, it is only barely hypothetical. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court held that warrants were
constitutionally required for a particular kind of administrative search, but that warrants could be issued
in that context upon a lesser showing than that required by the traditional probable cause standard. See
id. at 539. A strong argument can be made that the Fourth Amendment does not manifest any preference
for search warrants - in other words, that a "reasonable" search and seizure need not be one authorized
in advance by a magistrate. See generallyAmar, supra note 14, at 761-81. What is not reasonably open
to argument, given the text, is that the Fourth Amendment permits warrants to issue upon less than
probable cause, yet the Camara Court adopted that position anyway in order to allow regulatory
searches the Court deemed to be in the public interest.
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On the conflict model, the court's ruling would not be considered an activist
decision. The court and the legislature have followed the same policy of
allowing searches where probable cause is lacking, and without conflict, the
argument goes, there is no activism. This conclusion follows, I think, only if
one assumes that courts are supposed to be inactive rather than simply restrained. There is, however, a critical distinction between an "activist" court, on
the one hand, and an "active" court, on the other. A court faithful to principles
of judicial restraint could never be "activist" (at least not in a first-best world)
but would nevertheless be quite "active" (and unyielding) in terms of demanding that other branches of government remain within their proper constitutional
bounds.47 It could hardly be otherwise if we accept as a given Marbury v.
Madison,4 8 which held that applying the Constitution in cases or controversies
is an essential part of the "judicial Power" vested in the federal courts by Article
III. Under Marbury, then, federal courts must be active, even on a restraintist
view, because they are duty-bound to set aside the policy initiatives of other
49
branches when those initiatives conflict with constitutional norms.
To be sure, a different approach conceivably could have been taken in
Marbury, and it is possible, with some effort, to imagine a United States of
America founded on the British model of legislative supremacy unencumbered
by judicial review. 50 The obvious response, it seems to me, is that the British
system is emphatically not our system. Once judicially enforceable constitutionalism is accepted as a bedrock principle of American governance, the notion
that judges (who, as Marbury points out, are oath-bound to uphold the Constitution) would be justified in acting in contravention of plain commands in the
Constitution, or in issuing decisions allowing other government actors to do so,
can only be viewed as exceedingly strange.
Professor Lino Graglia argues that this result is not as strange as it seems

47. I limit the claim about judicial restraint precluding activism to the first-best world because, as I
argue elsewhere, even a judge who firmly believes in judicial restraint might properly take action
deemed activist in a second-best world as a means of counteracting activism (liberal or conservative) by
prior members of the Court. In the second-best world, activism in response to activism-what I call
"reactivism"-may actually promote judicial restraint in the aggregate as long as the reactivism is not
itself foreclosed by the constitutional or statutory text in question. See generally Stephen E Smith,
Activism as Restraint: Lessons from CriminalProcedure, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1057 (2002).
48. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
49. Id. at 177-78.
50. This is not in any way to question the correctness of Marbury, but rather simply to recognize the
possibility of having an ordered system of liberty without judicial review. See, e.g., Klarman, supra
note 6, at 412; Graglia, supra note 10, at 82. That said, however, it is noteworthy that emerging
democracies, presented with the American and British systems as potential models for their new
governments, have consistently opted for the American model of judicially enforced constitutionalism.
This track record suggests that our Marbury-based system is widely perceived to be the superior
method of guaranteeing individual rights and liberties and the rule of law more generally. See Steven
Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. L. REV. 269, 269 (1993) (observing that the "written,
judicially-enforced constitution has become one of the U.S.A.'s best-selling (and least remunerative)
exports" whereas its "main competitor, the legislatively-enforced, aspirational constitution, has been
abandoned by virtually all civil law and common law countries in the world").
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because "permitting the results of the political process to stand," though "inconsistent with constitutionalism," is "not activism."' 5 I The argument misses at least
two important points. The first, stated above, is that ours is a system of a
judicially enforceable Constitution. If the Constitution is binding on all other
branches of government, both state and federal, it is unthinkable that it would be
proper for judges, in effect, to excuse other branches' violations of the document or accomplish the same result by blindly deferring to the presumptive
belief of nonjudicial actors in the constitutionality of their own actions.
The second point that Professor Graglia's analysis overlooks is that the
Constitution itself is a majoritarian policy choice, albeit, as nonoriginalists
would be quick to remind us, one made by people long since dead. As
Alexander Hamilton aptly put it, judicial review "supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both [the judicial and legislative power]; and that where
the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of
the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the
latter rather than the former.",52 As a result, unless one rejects the notion of
intergenerational fidelity to the Constitution-and Professor Graglia himself
does not 53-there is no principled basis on which courts can give preference to
policy choices embodied in statutes over those embodied by the Constitution
54
itself.
Of course, "dead-hand" theorists may well view constitutional fidelity as an
unwarranted means of shackling present generations to the outmoded views of
the Founding generation. If "dead-hand" control is unacceptable when it comes
to questions of intent, a nonoriginalist might ask, why should such control
through adherence to a text written hundreds of years ago, in a vastly different
world by men whose ideologies were radically different from our own, receive
any more fidelity from present society or its judges? 55 Even accepting for
present purposes the premise of the syllogism-which strikes me as far from
self-evident 56 -- the argument proves far too much.
51. Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's JudicialActivism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
293, 296 (1996).
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
53. Graglia, supra note 51, at 296.
54. At the same time, however, Professor Graglia is quite right that there is no principled basis on
which courts can prefer their own policy choices to those of the political branches to the extent the
judicially preferred policies are not rooted in the Constitution. Unless a judicial decision enjoys some
affirmative support in the Constitution, whether in its language or structure, a court can hardly claim
that it is enforcing the Constitution instead of its own policy preferences or, in the language of the
Founding generation, that it is exercising "judgment" instead of "will." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
230 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966) (quoted in infra note 59).
55. My colleague Professor Michael Klarman has pursued inquiries along these very lines. Klarman,
supra note 6. His conclusion is that, whether the reference point is constitutional text or intent of the
Framers, the Constitution does not "deserve our fidelity" and that society should not "be ruled from the
grave." Id. at 38 1.
56. For a thoughtful response to the usual arguments against original intent as a basis for constitutional interpretation, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
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If federal judges are not to be bound by any constraint that smacks of
"dead-hand" control, then there would seem to be no external limit on the
power of the judiciary. True, there are means of political control over the courts
that might in theory constrain judges, such as overruling decisions by constitutional amendments, stripping the courts of jurisdiction over certain subjects, and
(conceivably) impeaching and removing judges guilty of misconduct. These
political checks, however, have failed to constrain even the most pronounced
periods of countermajoritarian activism in our history, including the Lochner era
57

and the Warren Court Revolution.

If text and political controls do not constrain judicial behavior, then the will
and values of the individual judge would seem to be the most readily available
bases of adjudication. In that event, it is no exaggeration to say that the federal
courts would wield untrammeled judicial power over the lives, liberty, and

property of citizens, as well as the prerogatives of the politically accountable
branches of government. This result would offend traditional Anglo-American
conceptions of the rule of law, which are founded on the proposition that
"1something other than the mere will of the individuals deputized to exercise
government powers must have primacy.",58 To the extent judges are not ruled by
law and the rest of society is ruled by judges, then, as the Founders themselves
were quite aware, judicial review might well prove to be more of a curse than a

blessing.5 9

57. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 46-48
(1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. Even the power to appoint and confirm new
judges-which, as the demise of the Warren Court Revolution shows, can fundamentally shift the
direction of the courts over time--does not work as a real constraint on judicial behavior on the front
end, particularly given the difficulty of predicting the behavior of nominees on the bench and the
postwar phenomenon of the presidency being in the hands of one party and the Congress in the hands
of the other. See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 870-78 (1991). Moreover, short
of death or serious physical or mental impairments, judges can, to some extent, counteract the
appointments power by strategically timing their own retirements, as Chief Justice Warren attempted to
do (to deny Nixon the chance to name his replacement), and as Justice Blackmun did (to allow
President Clinton to name a Justice committed to abortion rights). To be sure, the appointment power
can bring periods of particularly pronounced activism to an end after they have already taken place, but
by then the damage may be irreversible.
58. Ronald A. Cass, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 3 (2001); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
"The Rule Of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1997) (noting
that "leading modem accounts" of the rule of law all subscribe to "the supremacy of legal authority"
and therefore posit that "law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens"); cf.,
e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
283, 287 (1996) (arguing that nonoriginalists "have little respect for law, at least insofar as law might
be a genuinely operative constraint on the Court").
59. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 230 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966) ("The
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges
distinct from that body."). As one commentator has stated: "Constitutionalism, as has often been noted,
raises the problem of the rule of the living by the dead. Judicial activism raises the very different
problem of rule by unelected, life-tenured judges who are very much alive." Graglia, supra note 5 1, at
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Discomfort with the sweeping implications of judicial review not bounded by
external legal constraints has produced broad consensus among believers in
judicially enforceable constitutionalism from all points on the ideological spectrum (even from nonoriginalist quarters) that the Constitution as written is
binding on judges. As Professor Tom Grey has declared: "We are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over whether judges should stick to interpreting,
but over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should
adopt." 6 The breadth of this consensus among believers in judicial review
weakens any objection that building textualism into my definition of activism
strips it of the ideological neutrality I seek. Even if this point of view requires
commitment to a "preconstitutional rule" positing the controlling nature of the
Constitution, that rule seems so thoroughly uncontroversial, and is so widely
accepted, as to be unproblematic for present purposes.
The point that judges should not stray beyond interpretation into the realm of
enforcing their own policy choices at the expense of those of the political
branches need not rest on formalism alone, however. Viewed even in functional
terms, there is little reason for faith in the institutional competency of courts, as
compared to legislative bodies, to make the policy judgments required by what
was once called "noninterpretive" review. Indeed, it seems fairly certain that,
for all their obvious faults, legislatures would have the comparative advantage
in making those sorts of judgments.
296. Consistent with this view, a number of prominent liberal scholars, convinced that constitutional
interpretation can really never be anything more than enforcement of the values of the judge, have
advocated abolishing judicial review altogether. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Klarman, supra note
6. By contrast, Professor Seidman argues that judicial review is defensible precisely to the extent that it
is informed by the judges' own political commitments. See LoUIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2002).
60. Thomas Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984); see generally STONE
ET AL., supra note 29, at 296 ("Almost all commentators believe that the text of the Constitution is
binding."). Interpretivists believe that judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are
stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution"; noninterpretivists, on the other hand, contend that
"courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the
four corners of the document." ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 57, at 1. As the Grey
quotation suggests, even proponents of the broadest theories of constitutional adjudication bristle at the
suggestion that they favor a noninterpretive role for the courts, and so the terms "interpretivism" and
"noninterpretivism" have fallen into disuse lately. What is significant for present purposes, however, is
not the terminology but rather what it tells us about textualism. The very fact that constitutional
theorists and judges are so unwilling to be viewed as being "against" interpreting the Constitution as
written, and are so willing to rely on textual argument when it supports their positions, shows the
privileged place that textualism deservedly holds in constitutional theory. As Professor Amar has
recently written, "[t]extualism, broadly understood, is woven into the fabric of conventional constitutional interpretation." Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 34
(2000). By "textualism," I mean the usual definition of that approach to constitutional interpretation,
which involves discerning the meaning and implications of the words used in the Constitution and
deriving meaning from constitutional structure. See generally id. at 28-33. This, of course, is not the
only possible understanding of textualism. One considerably broader approach would allow judges to
abstract generalized principles from the Constitution and then apply those principles (as opposed to the
text itself) as the basis for decision. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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After all, legislatures are directly accountable to the electorate (or at least the
part of the electorate that goes to the polls) and thus can be expected to reflect
the views and values of society as a whole far more reliably than unelected,
unaccountable judges. 6 The fact that federal judges do not stand for election
means that they are under no compulsion to bridge the cultural divide that
separates them and other members of the cultural elite from the rest of society.6 2
It is also commonly accepted that legislatures have a substantial informational
advantage over courts, which are limited to data adduced by the parties in trial
records, or by amici curiae in "Brandeis briefs," in resolving the many empirical questions on which sound decisionmaking depends in a complex society.
Legislatures also have more flexibility (and hence more room for creativity) in
dealing with difficult questions of social choice; the remedial arsenal of the
courts, though potent, is fairly limited. Therefore, substantial formalist and
functional reasons alike support the notion that it is illegitimate for judges to
reach results at odds with the plain meaning of written texts.
Until now, this discussion of the interpretive-fidelity aspect of activism has
rested on an implicit assumption that should be laid bare before moving on to
other issues. A key principle motivating my attempt to define activism has been
that the concept should be more than shorthand for a claim that a decision is
legally incorrect. For this reason, I have defined the interpretive-fidelity component of activism solely in terms of a decision's permissibility in light of text and
structure, which I regard as ideologically neutral because of the broad consensus that the Constitution itself (and, in statutory cases, the legislation that
becomes law) is binding on judges. Where the text being interpreted is plain and
unambiguous, of course, this approach dictates only one permissible (i.e.,
nonactivist) outcome-namely, that required by the language or structure. This
much, hopefully, is fairly straightforward. The real question has to do with
indeterminacy.
If the constitutional or statutory text is indeterminate, a range of potential
interpretive options will be available to a court. Some of those options will be

61. Public choice theorists have strongly challenged the representativeness of legislatures and their
institutional capacity to put the interests of the public ahead of those of powerful special interests. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875 (1975). Those critiques, in my view, establish that legislatures are
frequently far from perfect guardians of the public interest. Still, the question remains whether courts
are appreciably better than legislatures in this respect. For reasons cogently explained by Professor
Einer Elhauge, I believe that, so far at least, public choice theory has not shown that courts would be
any better as guardians of the public interest. See generally Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L. J.31 (1991).
62. See generally Michael J. Klarman, What's so Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U. L. REV.
145, 189-90 (1998) ("Justices of the United States Supreme Court, indeed of any state or federal
appellate court, are overwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually
at the nation's more elite universities. Moreover, unlike legislators who generally share a similar
cultural background, federal judges enjoy a relative political insulation which significantly reduces any
offsetting obligation to respond to the non-elite political preferences of their constituents."). As a result,
Klarman concludes, 'judicial review is systematically biased in favor of culturally elite values." Id at 189.
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disqualified by text or structure alone, but others will not be. In that case, any
choice the court makes among the range of permissible interpretations-that is
to say, of the interpretations not disqualified by text or structure-will not be
activist in terms of interpretive fidelity, even though the correctness of its choice
will certainly be debatable on the merits. 63 In other words, all the interpretivefidelity definition of activism does is delimit the bounds within which judges
have discretion; as long as they do not transgress those bounds, their resulting
decisions may or may not be "wrong" but nevertheless will not be "activist"
from the standpoint of interpretive fidelity.
Notice, however, that my interpretive-fidelity understanding of activism stops
there. It does not try and prescribe a single "correct" outcome and condemn all
others as "activist." To do so, in fact, would be inconsistent with the goal of this
project, which is to try and define activism in ideologically neutral terms,
drawing only on commonly held intuitions about the proper judicial role.
Consistent with that goal, the concept of interpretive fidelity simply takes key
premises of our system of judicially enforced constitutionalism under Marbury
and limits permissible judicial action to those premises. To the extent the court
is enforcing a written document (and recall that the fact that the Constitution is
a written document is an important part of the theoretical foundation for judicial
review as conceived in Marbury), then its decision must find some support in it
and certainly cannot be foreclosed by it. Naturally, this approach leaves room,
perhaps even considerable room at times, for judicial discretion, but that is only
because of the capacious terms in which much of the Constitution is written and
because the goal here is to try to derive a consensus-driven, and ideologically
neutral, understanding of judicial activism.
Another potential interpretive-fidelity approach to defining activism would
be, in effect, to prescribe a "standard of proof' that must be met before courts
can strike down governmental action. An example of this approach is Professor
Graglia's claim that activism constitutes "disallowing policy choices by other
governmental officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly

63. This concept of a range of permissible outcomes has antecedents throughout the law. Under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a habeas court takes the state court's resolution of a constitutional
issue and determines whether it was within the range of permissible outcomes under previously
established federal caselaw. It is only if the state court's resolution lies outside of that range that habeas
relief can be granted under Teague. The same basic analytical inquiry is made on qualified immunity
issues in suits seeking money damages under section 1983 - did the officer exceed the bounds of
permissible state action delineated by prior caselaw clearly? If not, a damages claim under section 1983
fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). Administrative
law provides yet another example: "Chevron deference" requires courts to accept an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute committed to its administration as long as it represents a "permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). In all these areas, the law recognizes that a constitutional text or a statutory text,
while ruling out a number of interpretive options as impermissible, may nevertheless leave open a
range of other interpretive options such that the text gives no indication as to which of the open options
is the "right" one. For a helpful elaboration of this concept, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis And
DemonstrablyErroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2001).
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prohibit."64 To take this approach would defeat the ideological neutrality that I
am trying to achieve and would introduce a principle-that judicial review
should not be exercised except to correct unmistakeable constitutional transgressions-that is, to say the least, not apparent from the Constitution or generally
accepted as valid. As Professor Gary Lawson has written, "the selection of a
standard of proof... is a profoundly normative enterprise. As far as I can tell,
of originalism, or of the
there is nothing in the nature of interpretation,
65
Constitution that can provide the answer.",
B. THE "INTERPRETIVE THEORY" MODEL

Another model of activism would build on a preferred method of constitutional interpretation. Under this approach, one would posit the "correct" method
of interpreting the Constitution-whether that be originalism, natural law,
66
tradition, or political process theory, to name a few of the leading contenders and reject all other theories as intrinsically activist. So, for example, nonoriginalists would consider originalist decisions to be activist, and adherents of political
process theory would reject broader approaches to constitutional decisionmak67
ing as activist.
The appeal of this approach is readily apparent. The reason judges and
scholars adopt a particular method of constitutional interpretation is, presumably, that they believe it will generate "better" results than the alternatives,
measured either in terms of legitimacy or normative attractiveness. 68 The flaws,
however, are equally plain. Such an approach to defining activism would be a
"conversation-stopper ' '69 in the sense that those who do not subscribe to a
particular interpretive theory would not accept a definition of activism premised
on that theory. In that instance, "activism" would be again reduced to an epithet
telling us nothing more, so far as interpretive methodology is concerned, than

64. Graglia, supra note 51, at 296.
65. Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 422
(1996); see generally Gary Lawson, Proving The Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). Though often
associated with the virtue of judicial restraint, see, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation, and JudicialRestraint, 5 Nw. U. L. REV. 961, 973 (2001), the "clear and convincing" standard for
proving constitutional law may be normatively problematic as well to the extent it would transform
Article III courts from restrained but nonetheless "active" institutions of government into inactive ones.
As Professor Graglia himself notes on another occasion, "examples of enacted law clearly in violation
of the Constitution are extremely difficult to find." Graglia, supra note 10, at 67. This is not to deny that
there are easy cases under the Constitution, but rather simply to say that those are not the cases that are
litigated. Inactivity on the part of the courts would be unfortunate because it is commonly accepted,
even by proponents of limited judicial power, that "judges have something unique to contribute to
public decisionmaking." ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING
OURSELVES IN AN ANxious AGE 46 (1989); see also Calbresi, supra note 50, at 272-78.
66. For a brief overview, see STONE ET AL., supra note 29, at 692-98.
67. By way of example, Raoul Berger has argued that nonoriginalist decisions are activist. See Raoul
Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REV. 751, 771-72 (1984).
68. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 549-50
(1999).
69. Klarman, supra note 62, at 194.
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that the maker and the object of the accusation subscribe to different methodologies of interpreting the Constitution. The most that can be said, if there is to be
any hope for an ideologically neutral definition of activism, is that interpretive
theories are activist to the extent they are employed to produce results that have
no support in written texts or are outside the range of permissible interpretations
in light of the relevant text.
Some might question the neutrality of this approach, on the view that binding
judges to constitutional text is an intrinsically conservative approach to constitutional interpretation. The breath of consensus, on all parts of the ideological
divide, that the text is binding on judges negates any such critique. 70 Again,
under my definition of activism, nontextualist methods of interpretation may be
utilized in choosing among interpretive options that are not themselves ruled out
by constitutional text or structure, so there is no intrinsic bias against or in favor
of any particular interpretive theories in my account of activism.
C. THE "ASSERTIVENESS" MODEL

Another definition of activism offered in the literature refers to the willingness of a court "to use its authority to engage in judicial review in an assertive
manner."7' Though vaguely stated, the basic idea is that a court is activist if it is
too "assertive" in its exercise of the power of judicial review. An example of
assertive (and hence activist) review, according to the assertiveness model, is
overruling or limiting prior precedents and announcing previously unknown
innovations in doctrine.7 2 The same would be true if a court were to reach out to
decide unnecessary issues in a case or to decide cases in which the legal issues
have become moot or the party invoking the court's jurisdiction lacks standingeven if the ultimate decision happens to be correct on the merits, the court
simply decided "too much."7 3

Another related component of activism under the assertiveness model would
be the extent of the remedy ordered for a constitutional violation, an issue of
particular importance in structural reform litigation. Even in remedying a

70. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 57, at 1 (noting that it "would be a mistake to
suppose that there is any necessary correlation between an interpretivist approach to constitutional
interpretation and political conservatism").
71. FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF THE WARREN COURT
LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 7 (1999).
72. Id.
73. Professor Bickel argued that the doctrines of standing, mootness, political questions, and
ripeness protect passive virtues by preventing unwarranted intervention by the federal courts in
disputed issues of the day. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS IIl (1962). Related to Professor Bickel's notion of passive
virtues are broader notions of "minimalism," which posit that courts should decide as little as possible,
resolving only issues essential to a proper disposition of the case. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 6 (1996). Both the passive virtues and minimalism (though not
Professor Sunstein's strict brand of minimalism) have been mainstays of the federal courts for quite
some time. See generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (enumerating various aspects of these principles as "rules" for constitutional adjudication).
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violation of the Constitution, the model would hold, federal courts have no
warrant to impose far-reaching remedies (such as ordering tax increases or
taking over public schools) when less intrusive measures would be sufficient to
resolve the matter.74 Courts should also stay their hand when politically accountable institutions of government are both willing and in a better position than the
75
court to devise an effective remedy for an adjudged constitutional violation.
This model of activism focuses solely on the manner in which courts perform
their review functions-how "assertive" or aggressive has the court been in
deciding a case? This line of inquiry is of obvious relevance on the subject of
activism, but, standing alone, it gives an incomplete picture of the phenomenon
of activism. As shown above, there is a strong substantive component to
activism, one that looks to the propriety of the end result in the case, measured
by fidelity to text and structure. This is shown by the bitterness of criticisms of
Warren Court decisions like Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio-what
critics found particularly offensive about these rulings was not that the Court
"decided too much" or acted without sufficient grounding in past precedents,
but rather that the Court "handcuffed" the police with restrictions that simply
could not be justified under any proper view of the Constitution. By ignoring
the permissibility of end results as a measure of activism, the assertiveness
76
model fails to account for an important aspect of the phenomenon of activism.
Still, the model is useful for emphasizing what might be described as the
procedural aspects of activism. To the extent a court is overly aggressive in its
resolution of cases, it begins to look more like a legislative body than a court.
Unlike a court, a legislature is a self-starting body that sets its own agenda and

74. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1972) (holding that relief across school district
lines in a desegregation case is not warranted absent proof of an "interdistrict" constitutional violation
and segregative effect across district lines).
75. Justice Thomas has been the most forceful proponent of this view on the current Court. In Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), for example, he argued that "Article III cannot be understood to
authorize the federal judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, and
hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state officials are
both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make." Id. at 385 (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 123-38 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). My own view is closer
to the traditional one. Federalism and separation of powers concerns certainly limit the remedial
discretion of the federal courts, and federal courts should always bear in mind their own limitations and
the comparative advantages of other branches in running institutions like schools and prisons. Nevertheless, it is precisely because the Constitution is the "supreme Law of the Land," U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2, that, in my view, the federal courts have not only the power, but the duty to craft an appropriate and
effective remedy for a constitutional violation when a constitutional violator is not willing to cooperate
in good faith in correcting its violation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
76. Indeed, it is potentially misleading, as Posner suggests, to measure a decision based on its
aggressiveness without regard to its substantive merits. He argues that it is "wrong to equate activism
with boldness" because a bold decision may nevertheless be substantively correct. POSNER, supra note
37, at 216. A prime example is Marbury v. Madison. By endorsing the power of judicial review,
Marbury radically expanded the power of the federal courts, yet most would probably agree that the
decision was substantively correct. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of JudicialReview, 84 VA. L. REv. 333 (1998).
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exists primarily to announce rules of general applicability governing future
conduct or disputes. The source of these rules is the will of the legislature;
individual legislators vote based on their policy preferences (or those of their
constituents or favorite interest groups), and a consensus is reached or not based
on an up-or-down vote or a series of such votes.
A federal court, however, is supposed to act very differently. Article III courts
are reactive bodies that can weigh in on a dispute only at the instance of a
proper plaintiff and only when essential to resolution of a "case" or "controversy" within its jurisdiction. The courts "make law," but only by the commonlaw method of deriving the answer to current disputes from the previously
decided body of law and the received wisdom of prior judicial treatments of a
subject. 77 The law is derived on this account not primarily to make rules for the
future, but rather properly to resolve the case before the court. 78 Against the
backdrop of these common law paradigms, it is easy to see why scores of
overrulings and decisionmaking far beyond the minimum required to dispose of
the case would look rather suspect.7 9
To be sure, the Supreme Court occupies a unique position within the federal
judicial hierarchy. Given the almost entirely discretionary nature of its docket,
the Supreme Court takes cases for institutional reasons-to resolve questions of
national importance-rather than to ensure the proper resolution of particular
cases. For this reason, it is commonly supposed that the modem institutional
77. As Justice Scalia has explained, "'[T]he judicial Power of the United States' conferred upon this
Court... must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common-law tradition. That is
the power is 'to say what the law is,' not the power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our
forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges
make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it--discerning what the law is, rather than
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). For a good
overview of the common-law model of decisionmaking, see Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters":
Teague and New Rules, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 423,465-76 (1994).
78. Naturally, in a system committed to stare decisis, a judge presented with a case would know that
today's ruling will become a precedent for the future, and good judges, armed with that knowledge, will
craft their opinions with special care. Even so, the focus remains on the case before the court. I should
note that the common law approach cannot automatically be applied to state courts, which often are not
bound by the kinds of justiciability limitations that apply to federal courts. See generally Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.
REV.

1833 (2001).

79. Indeed, attacks on the Warren Court stressed the number of overrulings during Chief Justice
Warren's tenure as proof positive that activism was at work. For example, Justice Scalia has criticized
the Warren era as a time "marked by a newfound disregard for stare decisis," one in which "this Court
cast overboard numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an unceremonious
'heave-ho."' Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1993). The Rehnquist Court has
been something of a paradox on stare decisis. On the one hand, the Court has bolstered the force of
precedent by holding that prior precedents should be retained unless there is "special justification" for
an overruling. See generally Amar, supra note 60, at 81-82 (documenting this change in stare decisis
doctrine). On the other hand, the Rehnquist Court has stressed that, even after the Warren era,
overrulings have not been exceptional occurrences, noting in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991),
that "the Court has during the past 20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous
constitutional decisions." Id. at 828.
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role of the Supreme Court would be impeded by adherence to the justiciability
limitations on the federal courts. 80 This supposition, however, is wrong. When
issues of constitutional law are squarely presented in a proper case, both
justiciability doctrines and traditional maxims of judicial minimalism permit the
Supreme Court to resolve the case in a comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion
that, in the course of deciding the case at hand, lays down principles that will

serve as precedent for future cases. 8 ' Particularly given the malleability of
justiciability doctrines, there is no reason to think that standing or mootness
doctrines, for example, would often pose any serious obstacles to adjudication if
the Court were sufficiently convinced of the need to reach the merits in a case.
As the common law account suggests, the doctrine of stare decisis serves important
policies. Among them are promoting judicial efficiency and enabling members of the
public to order their affairs without fear of undue disruption caused by sharp and
frequent reversals in precedent. 82 "Rule of law" values also figure prominently here,
as the Founding generation understood: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them." 83 For this reason, the Court itself has held that "[a]dhering to precedent 'is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it 8 is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." 4
That said, the assertiveness model is too blunt in its treatment of fidelity to
precedent. The model's suggestion that overrulings are themselves strong, if not
conclusive, indicators of activism is difficult to square with established law goveming
stare decisis. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "[s]tare decisis is not an

80. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
81. See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 73, at 235-43. In fact, this is one of the
key distinctions between the traditional concept of judicial minimalism and Professor Sunstein's
reconceptualization of minimalism. Sunstein's democracy-forcing brand of minimalism requires judicial opinions to be "as incompletely theorized as possible" in order to leave as much as possible for
resolution by the politically accountable branches of government. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 99. This
brand of minimalism would indeed be inconsistent with the modern institutional role of the Supreme
Court and, I would gather, intentionally so.
82. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (noting that stare decisis ensures that "the
law will not merely change erratically" and "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals").
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 232-33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966); see also,
e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("The Court has said often and with
great emphasis that 'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law."').
This is not to suggest, however, that the doctrine of stare decisis is of constitutional dimension. There
appears to be a growing consensus that stare decisis, though familiar to and specifically contemplated
by members of the founding generation, is not constitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and
Casey, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1570-82 (2000); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of
Precedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503, 513-31 (2000); but see Richard Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the
Constitution:An Essay on ConstitutionalMethodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577-85 (2001) (arguing
that stare decisis is of constitutional dimension).
84. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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inexorable command," and this maxim is "particularly true in constitutional cases,
because in such cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible." 85 Given that overrulings are explicitly permitted, in appropriate cases, by stare
decisis, the fact that decisions are overruled cannot, on its own, constitute proof of
activism, even though, as a descriptive matter, it is certainly true that one would
expect to see scores of overrulings during periods of heightened judicial activism.
Still, it does not follow from the fact that courts are empowered to overrule
their own prior decisions that fidelity to precedent is irrelevant to the proper definition
of activism. The reasons advanced for the overruling may be a significant part
of the inquiry. Stare decisis rules, in their current form at least, emphasize that
decisions may not be overruled simply because they are considered to be wrong
by a later court; instead, "special justification" is required before a court can
properly jettison prior precedent.8 6 A decision that overrules prior precedent
without sufficient justification under stare decisis doctrine is illegitimate
in light
87
of the earlier precedent and therefore should be deemed activist.
My colleague Professor Caleb Nelson has argued that the presumption against
overruling precedents should not apply (and, descriptively speaking, did not apply
historically) to "demonstrably erroneous" precedents.8 8 Given my view that it is
activist for judges to disregard clear constitutional or statutory text, I agree that stare
decisis doctrine should be revised to recognize clear or demonstrable error as a valid
basis for overruling a prior precedent. 89 That said, however, given the present state of
85. Id. at 828; see also, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). The Court has been
emphatic that "[olur precedents are not sacrosanct," noting that "we have overruled prior decisions
where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established." Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
86. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; see also, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that "any
departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification"); see Nelson, supra note 63,
at 2 (noting that the Court and commentators alike subscribe to the "conventional wisdom" that "a
purported demonstration of error is not enough to justify overruling a past decision"). In deciding whether to
overrule prior cases, the Court typically looks to several policy considerations, including (1)the "workability"
of prior decisional law, (2) the extent of reliance on the prior decision, (3) whether the prior doctrine's
theoretical foundations have been undermined by later cases, and (4) whether factual circumstances
critical to the prior decision have changed. Id. For a good general discussion of these policy factors which obviously are malleable enough to be manipulated to allow overrulings where desired or to
justify adherence to erroneous precedents in other contexts - see Paulsen, supra note 83, at 1551-64.
87. There is a sense in which it may seem circular to say that court-made stare decisis rules should
determine the propriety of overrulings, but that is only because neither the Framers not Congress have
seen fit to speak to the issue of precedent. Despite their judicial origin, stare decisis rules are
"authoritative legal rules" that judges cannot casually disregard. See Harrison, supra note 83, at 505.
Similarly, a court's handling of precedent should be considered activist if the court is less than
forthright in its treatment of precedent, such as by distinguishing cases on immaterial grounds or
misconstruing statements in prior decisions to avoid having to disavow or adhere to the prior decisions.
In a common law system of adjudication, later courts are supposed to follow earlier binding precedents
unless the facts in the later case are materially different in some respect or the court overrules the prior
decision based on a ground recognized as valid under stare decisis rules.
88. See generally Nelson, supra note 63. Professor Amar agrees that, traditionally speaking, a
sufficiently persuasive showing of error was regarded as a valid ground for overruling a prior case. See
Amar, supra note 60, at 78-89 & n.28.
89. Here, the standard of proof is significant. A court ought to be more reluctant to overrule a
decision that is arguably correct than a decision that is clearly (and therefore demonstrably) incorrect.
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stare decisis doctrine and its disapproval of error as a sufficient basis for overrulings,
it is proper to regard decisions overruling prior cases based only on a showing of
"demonstrable error" as activist, but that type of activism would readily be justified by
the Court's overarching duty of fidelity to constitutional or statutory texts.9°
Some proponents of judicial restraint might object that activism, once identified, is by definition unjustified. This is a principled position, but not one that
will actually promote judicial restraint. If one is really interested in promoting
judicial restraint, then it may be necessary at times for a court, confronted with
prior instances of activism, to respond in kind so that the pendulum might be
moved back in the direction of restraint, e.g., of adherence to clear written
texts. 9 ' Otherwise, as Professor Amar has written, "the Constitution might
ultimately be wholly eclipsed," with "judicial doctrine ... eras[ing] its outlines"
instead of "simply filling the Constitution's gaps." 92

III.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

As shown above, each of the competing models of activism offered in the
literature contains important insights into the nature of activism, but each one is
insufficient, standing alone, to capture common intuitions about activism. A
more comprehensive understanding of activism is needed if there is to be any
hope of bringing some degree of uniformity to usage of the term "activism." I
will now outline my own definition of activism, drawing on the various models
of activism previously discussed.
The concept of activism has both substantive and procedural components. A

decision is "substantively activist" if the result it reached is contrary to clear
constitutional or statutory text or lacks affirmative support in the text being
interpreted, or is reached by overruling prior binding precedent without adIn the first instance, there is no inherent reason for confidence that reconsideration would produce a
better decision than the first one, and so courts should avoid upsetting the status quo and related
reliance interests. Where, however, a court is convinced that a prior ruling was not only wrong but
clearly so, the case for reconsideration is compelling, at least short of extraordinarily strong reliance
interests counseling adherence to prior law.
90. I may be more cynical than Professor Nelson: in my view, doctrine aside (which is as he
describes it), demonstrably erroneous precedents often do not in fact receive stare decisis effect from
the Court. The Court manipulates the malleable "special justification" factors to permit overruling of
precedents they view as clearly erroneous and wish to overturn. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality opinion) (arguing that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), "was
wrong the day it was decided" and that Brown was "not only justified but required" to overrule it
because "the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to
the Court in 1954" concerning the stigmatizing effects of segregation laws on blacks). The flip side is
true as well: Where, as in Casey and Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), the
Justices disagree with a prior precedent (even to the point of terming it demonstrably erroneous) but do
not want to overrule it for political or other reasons, the manipulation runs in the other direction, and
reliance or other policy concerns are exaggerated to save the prior precedent. See Paulsen, supra note
83, at 1538 & n.6.
91. See generally Smith, supra note 47. Other than where necessary to correct prior activist
decisions, however, judicial activism is unjustified.
92. Amar, supra note 60, at 83.
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equate justification in light of applicable stare decisis rules or by distinguishing
or limiting binding precedents on grounds that were not material to the results
reached in the prior cases. These are "substantive" aspects of activism because,
in each instance, the necessary implication is that the judges overstepped the
proper bounds of their authority and rendered a decision they were not entitled
to make on the usual common-law model of decisionmaking. Substantive
activism often will, but need not, result in "conflict" between the judiciary and
the political branches of government, measured in terms of invalidation of
action undertaken by other branches (including statutes or criminal convictions).
"Procedural activism," by contrast, is concerned with the method by which a
decision is reached instead of the correctness of the end result. A decision is
"procedurally activist" if it reaches the merits when justiciability doctrines
grounded in Article III would counsel against doing so or if it resolves more
issues than are necessary, strictly speaking, to resolve the case. In these instances, the underlying result may or may not be correct, and may or may not be
substantively activist, yet the decision has been reached through improper
means and therefore should be considered procedurally activist.
It is important to note that both aspects of activism, substantive and procedural, are defined in ideologically neutral terms. This approach recognizes that,
contrary to public perception, "activism" is not simply a synonym for politically
liberal decisionmaking by judges, as some conservative critics would have us
believe, nor is it, as Rehnquist Court critics have suggested, a "blame word"
applicable only to decisions retrenching on rights. Conservative judges no less
than liberal judges may be guilty of activism depending either on how well the
results they reach mesh with authoritative written texts and prior precedent, or
on the means by which they reached them. Regardless of whether the Court is
"expanding" or "contracting" rights, or whether the decision tilts to the left or
the right politically, a unitary definition of activism should be applied uniformly.
In other words, we should stop using activism as an epithet-a form of
academic hate speech-and start using the term in a principled, even-handed
way. If we do, I think we will find that the Rehnquist Court, like probably every
Court before it, has resorted to activism at times. I think we would also find that
some of the Supreme Court's most strongly criticized decisions, both during the
Revolution and Counterrevolution in criminal procedure and in other areas as
well, were not activist at all-contestable, yes; wrong, perhaps; but not activist,
at least under a neutral definition of activism that aspires to be more than
shorthand for "I disagree." Ultimately, however, the correctness of my definition of activism or of my assessment of the Rehnquist Court's handiwork is not
important. What is important, I think, is that we finally drop the hypocrisy of
turning a blind eye to activism that produces results we find normatively
attractive while condemning activism that produces results we oppose. We
should say what we mean when we level charges of activism, and then be
prepared to apply that same standard consistently.

